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NAVIGATING THE FCPA’S AMBIGUOUS
“INSTRUMENTALITY” PROVISION: LESSONS
FOR THE ENERGY INDUSTRY
Clinton R. Long*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the years since the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)
was enacted in 1977,1 creating significant civil and criminal penalties
for persons and corporations who offer or pay bribes to the officials of
foreign governments,2 the energy industry has paid $2.12 billion in
fines under the statute.3 This ranks as the highest of any industry by a
significant margin, and represents nearly 50 percent of the $4.42 bil-
lion in total fines paid by all industries under the FCPA.4 Not only are
the fines significant, but the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has
brought a larger number of FCPA enforcement actions against the en-
ergy industry than against any other industry.5 Some even say that
U.S. authorities are targeting the energy industry and are “using [it]
to enforce United States corruption standards on the rest of the
world.”6
Regardless of the DOJ’s motives for its enforcement practices,
it is clear that there are significant FCPA risks in countries rich with
energy resources.7 Much of the world’s energy resources are located in
* Mr. Long is the Manager of International Compliance Research at TRACE In-
ternational. He received a B.A. (History) from Brigham Young University in 2008,
a J.D. and an M.A. (International Political Economy and Development) from Ford-
ham University in 2011, and an LL.M. (International and Comparative Law) from
the George Washington University Law School in 2013.
1 U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1 (2010) [hereinafter RE-
STORING BALANCE].
2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2012).
3 Where the Bribes Are: Penalties in U.S. Government FCPA Cases Since 1977,
JAMES MINTZ GROUP, http://fcpamap.com/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
4 Id.
5 Bob Tippee, Extractive Industries Are Top Target for Bribery Enforcement, OIL &
GAS J., Aug. 16, 2011, available at http://www.ogj.com/articles/2011/08/extractive-
industries-are-top-target-for-bribery-enforcement.html (citing TRACE INTERNA-
TIONAL, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2011, at 9 (2011)).
6 Reid Jonkers, Recent Development: Recent Trends in FCPA Enforcement, 4
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 297, 297 (2009).
7 Id.
393
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countries where bribery is prevalent and customary.8 Additionally, the
energy industry provides significant opportunities for interaction with
foreign government officials, the specific persons toward whom the
FCPA prohibits bribes.9 For example, in order to extract oil, natural
gas, and other resources in a specific country, a company must obtain
licenses and other documents directly from that country’s government,
which makes interaction with foreign officials frequent and conse-
quently increases the temptation to pay bribes.10
Another significant FCPA challenge for energy companies is
the presence of a wide variety of corporate structures in the industry,
specifically including a number of state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”).11
The presence of SOEs in the energy industry is problematic for FCPA
compliance because the statute prohibits bribes to “any officer or em-
ployee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instru-
mentality thereof . . . .”12 The statute does not define
“instrumentality,”13 but the DOJ has frequently considered SOEs to be
instrumentalities of foreign governments and, consequently, their em-
ployees to be foreign officials.14 This means that in the energy indus-
8 See, e.g., Azerbaijan and Oil: Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17,
2006, available at http://www.economist.com/node/7796434, cited in Robert
Peachey, Comment, Petroleum Investment Contracts After the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) Pipeline, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 739, 768 n.167 (2011).
9 Jonkers, supra note 6, at 297.
10 See id.
11 It has been said that “[a]n array of state-owned entities . . . dominate the
world’s oil and gas industry.” David G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview, in
OIL AND GOVERNANCE: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND THE WORLD ENERGY SUP-
PLY 3 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 2012). SOEs can be broadly defined as enter-
prises that are owned in whole or in part by a national or local government. See
Timothy Kyepa, Integrating the Proposed National Oil Company of Uganda into
the Corporate Governance Discourse: Lessons from Norway, 30 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 75, 82  (2012). They are “sometimes also referred to as government
corporations, government-linked companies, parastatals, public enterprises, or
public sector enterprises — [and] are a diverse mix ranging from internationally
competitive listed companies, large-scale public service providers, wholly owned
manufacturing and financial firms, to small and medium enterprises.” Id. (quoting
WORLD BANK, HELD BY THE VISIBLE HAND: THE CHALLENGE OF SOE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR EMERGING MARKETS 1 (2006), available at http://rru.worldbank.
org/Documents/Other/CorpGovSOEs.pdf [hereinafter HELD BY THE VISIBLE
HAND]).
12 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -
3(f)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
13 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 24.
14 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S.
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 20 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE].
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try, where there are SOEs literally from A (Albpetrol in Albania15) to Z
(Zawia Oil Refining Company in Libya16), and in other industries,
companies can encounter significant FCPA trouble when they pay
bribes to employees of SOEs.17
The inclusion of SOEs into the “instrumentality” provision has
not been popular with the private sector.18 Some have called for a mod-
ification of the FCPA to “include a clear definition of ‘instrumentality’”
to combat the uncertainty surrounding the term’s meaning.19 Others
have requested that the DOJ give additional guidance on the interpre-
tation of the term,20 which the DOJ recently provided.21 However,
neither of these proposed solutions can significantly help energy com-
panies comply with the FCPA in their business ventures abroad. De-
termining whether an SOE should be considered an instrumentality
for FCPA purposes is a fact-specific question requiring a case-by-case
analysis.22 Asking Congress or the DOJ for a change in the definition
of instrumentality or additional guidance will not necessarily reduce
FCPA risks because businesses would have a similarly difficult time
determining whether a foreign enterprise fits into that interpretation,
definition, or guidance.
The most effective way for energy companies to maneuver
through the difficulties of the FCPA’s instrumentality provision is to
strengthen their compliance mechanisms to prohibit bribery to any-
one—including officials of purely private enterprises.23 This is the saf-
est method of preventing FCPA liability and is necessary for energy
companies due to the existence of the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act
2010 (“Bribery Act”), which prohibits bribery of public and private offi-
15 Company Overview of Albpetrol Sh.A., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://invest
ing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=10741109
(last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
16 Zawia is a fully owned subsidiary of Libya’s oil SOE (National Oil Corporation).
Fully Owned, NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION, http://en.noclibya.com.ly/index.php?op
tion=com_content&task=view&id=318&Itemid=0 (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
17 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 20.
18 See, e.g., RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 25–27.
19 Id. at 27.
20 E.g., Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation:
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489,
576 (2011).
21 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at iv.
22 Id. at 20.
23 Some companies have already begun doing so. Concerns About the U.S. Cham-
ber Institute of Legal Reform’s Proposals for Amending the FCPA, GLOBAL FIN.
INTEGRITY 1, http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/Capitol_Hill/fcpa_
response_to_us_chamber.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL FIN.
INTEGRITY].
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cials.24 Energy companies thus have numerous incentives to treat all
foreign entities as instrumentalities and completely avoid FCPA liabil-
ity under the “instrumentality” provision.
This paper will first provide a background to the FCPA (includ-
ing the energy industry’s challenges in complying with the FCPA), and
an analysis of the FCPA’s “instrumentality” provision and how this
provision affects energy companies. Following this section, there will
be an analysis of the different interpretations of “instrumentality” held
by the DOJ, industry groups, scholars, and U.S. federal courts. This
paper will then propose that energy companies can avoid FCPA liabil-
ity by strengthening their compliance mechanisms to treat all foreign
entities as instrumentalities of foreign governments, or, in other
words, by prohibiting bribery to any foreign person.25
II. BACKGROUND
A. The FCPA and the Energy Industry
The FCPA was enacted in 1977, after the fallout from the
Watergate Scandal revealed that a number of U.S. companies had en-
gaged in extensive bribery of foreign government officials in order to
further their business interests.26 The essence of the FCPA for the
purposes of this paper can be stated as follows: no “issuer,”27 “domestic
concern,”28 or other relevant party29 can bribe30 a foreign official31 in
24 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 1. See infra Section IV (“Proposal”).
25 GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, supra note 23, at 1 (while not proposing this for compa-
nies, this source recognizes that some companies are already strengthening their
compliance programs for this purpose).
26 James A. Barta & Julia Chapman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 AM. CRIM.
L.REV. 825, 825–26 (2012).
27 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). The DOJ says that an issuer is “a corporation that has
issued securities that have been registered in the United States or who is required
to file periodic reports with the SEC.” Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Antibribery
Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 4–5, available at http://klifesolutions.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/GUI_GOV_DOJ_FCPA_Lay-Persons-Guide.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Lay-Person’s Guide].
28 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a). This is a broad term encompassing any “citizen, national,
or resident of the United States” as well as “any corporation, partnership, associa-
tion, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole pro-
prietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which
is organized under the laws of” any U.S. state, territory, or other possession. Lay-
Person’s Guide, supra note 27.
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (This includes anyone who does not fall into
the issuer or domestic concern categories but nonetheless uses “the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in further-
ance of . . .” an FCPA violation. Id. § 78dd-3(a). Furthermore, no one can perform a
prohibited action on behalf of any of these parties, and this includes any “officer,
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order to acquire or retain any form of business.32 Violations of the
FCPA can result in significant civil and criminal penalties—including
prison time and large fines—for individuals and corporations.33 Also,
it should be noted that parties subject to the FCPA can request an
Opinion from the U.S. Attorney General in order to determine whether
planned actions would violate the FCPA.34 This opinion procedure has
been used to ascertain whether a specific person could be considered a
“foreign official.”35
Energy companies have a long and checkered past with the
FCPA. In the investigation after the Watergate Scandal, a number of
oil companies were found to have made large payments to officials of
director, employee, or agent of [any of these parties] or any stockholder thereof
acting on behalf of [any of these parties]” to commit an FCPA violation.).
30 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), -2(a)(1), -3(a)(1) (While the word “bribe” is not used in the
description of these actions, the statute prohibits “an offer, payment, promise to
pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give,
or authorization of the giving of anything of value.”).
31 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(2), -2(a)(2), -3(a)(2). This also includes “any foreign political
party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office.” Id. §§ 78dd-
1(a)(3), -2(a)(3), -3(a)(3). Also bribes cannot be paid to “any person, while knowing
that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or prom-
ised, directly or indirectly, to . . .” either of the other two prohibited groups. Id.
§§ 78dd-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3), -3(a)(3).
32 The statute says “in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing
business to, any person” (1) in order to influence “any act or decision of such [recip-
ient] in [his, her, or its] official capacity;” (2) in order to induce that recipient “to do
or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such [recipient];” (3) in order
to secure “any improper advantage;” or (4) in order to induce the recipient “to use
[his, her, or its] influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to
affect or influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality.” Id.
§§ 78dd-1(a)(1)(B)-(2), -2(a)(1) (B)-(2), -3(a)(1) (B)-(2).
33 Id. §§ 1(a), -2(a), -3(a).
34 Issuer or Domestic Concern, 28 C.F.R. § 80.4 (2012). This is not meant to be an
opportunity for companies and persons to request opinions on hypothetical ques-
tions and facts; the transaction at issue “must be an actual—not a hypothetical—
transaction but need not involve only prospective conduct.” Transaction, 28 C.F.R.
§ 80.3 (2012).
35 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Procedure Release, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Review 1-2, 5 2, 6 (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/opinion/2012/1201.pdf (The issue was whether a member of a foreign
government’s royal family would be considered a foreign official. The DOJ found
that the royal family member was not a foreign official: he has no official govern-
ment title or position and had only worked for the government for a short period
many years prior, does not act on behalf of the government or royal family, enjoys
no governmental privileges due to his membership in the family, and does not
interact in any way with those officials deciding on the transactions.).
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foreign governments.36 “Overseas payments,” political contributions,
and other questionable payments were found in the books of Citgo, Ex-
xon, Gulf Oil, Mobil Oil, and others.37 Since the enactment of the
FCPA, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas—
which includes Houston, where many oil and gas companies have of-
fices38—has overseen a number of FCPA plea bargains39 and deferred
prosecution agreements.40 Some of the largest fines in the history of
the FCPA involve energy companies, such as Kellogg Brown & Root’s
$402 million fine (the second largest FCPA fine at the time) for bribing
Nigerian officials in exchange for a contract to build natural gas
facilities.41
The energy industry is susceptible to FCPA liability for a few
reasons. First, among the countries with the world’s largest reserves of
energy resources are many countries with corrupt governments.42 The
following table, listing countries whose oil or natural gas reserves (or
both) are among the highest fifteen amounts in the world, demon-
strates this relationship. The table also shows each country’s score
from Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index
(“CPI”), which “measures the perceived levels of public sector corrup-
36 Lewis D. Solomon & Leslie G. Linville, Transnational Conduct of American
Multinational Corporations: Questionable Payments Abroad, 17 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 303, 303–04 n.2 (1976).
37 Id., at 304.
38 E.g., List of Oil and Gas Companies in Houston, SUBSEA OIL & GAS DIRECTORY,
http://www.subsea.org/company/allbycity.asp (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
39 See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 1, U.S. v. Baker Hughes Serv. Int’l, No. 07-129
(S.D. Tx. Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/baker-hughs/04-11-07bakerhughes-plea.pdf.
40 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, U.S. v. Pride Int’l, No. 10-766
(S.D. Tx. Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/pride-intl/11-04-10pride-intl-dpa.pdf. “Deferred prosecution agreements are
essentially contracts with the DOJ, whereby the DOJ agrees not to pursue the
charges filed against the corporation so long as the corporation fulfills certain re-
quirements contained in the agreement.” John A. Gallagher, Note, Legislation is
Necessary for Deferred Prosecution of Corporate Crime, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 447,
449 (2010) (citing Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corpo-
rate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 321–22 (2007)).
41 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Update Resource Center, JENNER & BLOCK, Feb.
2009, (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC
Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Crimi-
nal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009)), available at http://jenner.com/resource_centers/update/
691[hereinafter KBR Press Release].
42 Jonkers, supra note 6, at 297.
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tion in countries worldwide” on a scale of 0 to 100.43 A lower score
indicates a higher perception of corruption.44 Each country’s ranking
is also listed in the CPI in comparison to all others (176 countries were
ranked in 2012).45
GasOil Reserves CPICountry Reserves CPI Score48Ranking46 Ranking49Ranking47
Saudi Arabia 2 6 44 66
Venezuela 3 9 19 165
Iran 5 3 28 133
Iraq 6 13 18 169
Kuwait 7 21 44 66
Russia 9 2 28 133
Libya 10 23 21 160
Nigeria 11 10 27 139
Kazakhstan 12 15 28 133
Brazil 13 34 39 80
China 17 14 43 69
Algeria 18 11 34 105
The CPI is admittedly selective, for example, it lists Canada as
having the fourth largest amount of oil reserves in the world50 and a
corresponding CPI score of 84, placing it among the ten most transpar-
ent countries in the world;51 however, this list of countries shows that
there are many energy-rich countries that have significant corruption
issues. When corruption is more prevalent in a foreign government,
bribe requests and offers are more likely to occur and more difficult to
43 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2012, at 2
(2012), available at http://files.transparency.org/content/download/537/2229/file/
2012_CPI_brochure_EN.pdf / [hereinafter CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2012].
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Central Intelligence Agency, Crude Oil - Proved Reserves, WORLD FACTBOOK
(2012), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2244rank.html [hereinafter Crude Oil - Proved Reserves].
47 Central Intelligence Agency, Natural Gas - Proved Reserves, WORLD FACTBOOK
(2012), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2253rank.html.
48 CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2012, supra note 43, at 3.
49 Id.
50 Crude Oil - Proved Reserves, supra note 46.
51 CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2012, supra note 43, at 3.
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avoid.52 This can create significant FCPA compliance issues for energy
companies,53 as the number of FCPA enforcement actions against the
industry demonstrates.54
Second, energy companies have significant amounts of interac-
tion with foreign governments.55 There are numerous opportunities for
regulatory interaction with officials such as customs agents56 and
through procedures for acquiring licenses and other documentation.57
Furthermore, foreign governments own much of the world’s energy re-
sources: for example, as of 2007, “77 percent of the world’s oil reserves
are held by national oil companies with no private equity, and there
are 13 state-owned oil companies with more reserves than Exx-
onMobil, the largest multinational oil company.”58 An energy com-
pany’s direct client, therefore, might be a foreign government or a
ministry, agency, or SOE that oversees that state’s natural re-
sources.59 Interaction with the government is absolutely necessary in
the energy industry on multiple fronts, and this can result in increased
FCPA liability.60
Third, energy companies often use agents to acquire con-
tracts.61 The FCPA extends liability from agents’ actions to their prin-
cipals,62 which means that companies in the energy industry must be
especially careful about who they hire and what those agents do on
52 See WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK 11 (1997), available at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/an
ticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
53 See Jonkers, supra note 6, at 297.
54 See Tippee, supra note 5 (citing TRACE INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT
REPORT 2011, at 9 (2011)).
55 See Jonkers, supra note 6, at 297.
56 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a
Freight Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations
and to Pay More Than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html.
57 See Jonkers, supra note 6, at 297.
58 Tina Rosenberg, The Perils of Petrocracy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 4, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/magazine/04oil-t.html?_r=1&oref=slog
in.
59 See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Foreign Firms Most Affected by a U.S. Law Barring
Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/09/04/business/global/bribery-settlements-under-us-law-are-mostly-with-for
eign-countries.html?pagewanted=all.
60 See Jonkers, supra note 6, at 297.
61 See, e.g., Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas
Law: An Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 795–96 (1992).
62 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2012).
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their behalf.63 These challenges mean that the energy industry is vul-
nerable to committing actions that the FCPA prohibits.64
B. The “Instrumentality” Provision
One of the more controversial aspects of the FCPA is the ambi-
guity surrounding the reference to a foreign government’s “instrumen-
tality.”65 This reference is found in the definition of “foreign official” in
the statute:
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a
public international organization, or any person acting in
an official capacity for or on behalf of any such govern-
ment or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or
on behalf of any such public international organization.66
Whether or not an entity is an “instrumentality” has significant impli-
cations: if an entity is considered an instrumentality of a foreign gov-
ernment, then its employees are considered foreign officials and
therefore cannot be bribed.67 This provision is important to a number
of FCPA enforcement actions. In 2009, the DOJ completed nine en-
forcement actions against corporations, and six of them required an
interpretation of whether employees of SOEs were “foreign officials.”68
The problem is that the statute does not define “instrumentality,”69
and until recently, there was a shortage of guidance on its meaning.70
The FCPA’s legislative history is also inconclusive on the matter.71 Ac-
cording to FCPA scholar Mike Koehler, nowhere in the FCPA’s legisla-
tive history is there an “express statement or information” about what
“instrumentality” means.72
63 Jonkers, supra note 6, at 297 (citing Palmina M. Fava et al., Energy Sector
Faces Greater FCPA Scrutiny, OIL & GAS FIN. J., Sept. 1, 2008, available at http://
www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-5/issue-9/features/energy-sector-faces-greater-
fcpa-scrutiny.html).
64 See Jonkers, supra note 6, at 297.
65 See, e.g., RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 24–27.
66 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
67 See id.
68 Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 412 (2010).
69 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 24.
70 The Resource Guide was released in November 2012 and dedicated two pages to
the “instrumentality” provision. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at iv, 20–21.
71 Declaration of Professor Michael Koehler at 3, U.S. v. Carson, No. 09-77 (C.D.
Ca. Feb. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Koehler Declaration].
72 Id. at 4.
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In the energy industry and others, it can be quite difficult to
know what “instrumentality” means in practice.73 One reason for this
is that throughout the world there exists a wide variety of government
involvement in many sectors of the world economy, and the lines be-
tween government agencies and private corporations are often un-
clear.74 Specifically, it is not always apparent whether SOEs are
instrumentalities of foreign governments.75 The DOJ considers many
SOEs to be instrumentalities,76 but the statute does not indicate what
level of government ownership or influence must be present.77
C. “Instrumentality” in the Energy Industry
While the ambiguity regarding the meaning of “instrumental-
ity” can be dangerous for any industry, it is particularly so for energy
companies. First, energy companies do business in a wide range of
countries around the world, which inherently involves working with a
number of different corporate structures with various levels of govern-
ment ownership.78 The industry is neither purely private nor public
and state involvement is prevalent.79
On one end of the spectrum of corporate structures in the in-
dustry are companies that are completely owned and controlled by a
foreign state and function like a government agency.80 An excellent
example is Petro´leos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”) under Hugo Cha´-
vez, the late president of Venezuela. While it is unclear what will hap-
pen with PDVSA now that Cha´vez’s presidency is over, PDVSA is
currently owned entirely by the government of Venezuela.81 The presi-
dent of PDVSA—Rafael Ramı´rez—has also been the oil minister and
73 See RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 24–27.
74 See HELD BY THE VISIBLE HAND, supra note 11, at 1 (SOEs “are a diverse mix
ranging from internationally competitive listed companies, large-scale public ser-
vice providers, wholly owned manufacturing and financial firms, to small and me-
dium enterprises”).
75 See RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 24–27.
76 Koehler Declaration, supra note 71, at 3.
77 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 25.
78 See HELD BY THE VISIBLE HAND, supra note 11, at 1.
79 Rosenberg, supra note 58 (Rosenberg offers some reasons as to why so many
national energy companies and SOEs exist: “nationalized oil is the trend. . . . Oil-
and gas-dependent countries are historically ill governed. Today their people are
in rebellion against globalization, which promised much but has brought them lit-
tle. They have been told their countries are rich, but they see they are poor. So
someone must be stealing the profits. Most often, nationalization is a reaction to
the idea that the thief is a foreign company.”).
80 See VICTOR ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
81 Stacy Rentner, Note, Venezuela: How a Hydrocarbons Law Crippled an Oil Gi-
ant, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 351, 355 (2004) (citing Uisdean R. Vass &
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was a close political ally of President Cha´vez.82 According to Ramı´rez,
PDVSA did not employ people who were not supporters of Cha´vez dur-
ing his presidency.83 Cha´vez also fired 18,000 “antigovernment man-
agers” in the midst of a strike at PDVSA and significant political
turmoil around the country in 2003.84 PDVSA had many characteris-
tics of a privately held corporation before Cha´vez became president,85
but clearly became an instrumentality of the Venezuelan government
under the FCPA86 or any other definition of the term while Cha´vez
was in office.
On the other end of the spectrum are a number of entities that
are partially owned by foreign governments and function far more like
private enterprises.87 For example, Eni is an Italian energy company
that does business in over eighty countries, employs more people
outside of Italy (45,516) than it does within the country (33,328), and
has stock on exchanges in Italy and the United States.88 Eni’s Board of
Directors selects the chief executive officer, and other aspects of the
corporate structure are typical of Italian law and tradition.89 In other
words, at first glance, Eni looks very similar to a number of large in-
ternational energy companies.
One distinguishing factor, however, is that the Italian govern-
ment owns slightly more than 30 percent of Eni.90 Additionally, the
government possesses a “golden share” which permits it, among other
things, to veto certain shareholder decisions despite its minority own-
ership.91 The extent of this share is unclear because Italy has faced
European Union law scrutiny and was recently threatened with an ac-
tion at the European Court of Justice regarding its golden shares in
multiple industries.92 These developments led Italy to reduce the pow-
Adriana Lezcano, The New Venezuelan Legal Regime for Natural Gas: A Hopeful
New Beginning?, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 99, 103 (2001)).
82 A Tragedy Foretold: A Fatal Refinery Blast Will Not Help Hugo Cha´vez, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 1, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21561934.
83 See id.
84 Juan Forero, Free-Spending Chavez Could Swing Vote His Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2004, at A3.
85 Rosenberg, supra note 58.
86 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A) (2012).
87 See VICTOR ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.




90 Id. at 8.
91 Id. at 9–10.
92 Italy Limits ‘Golden Share’ Rules to Avoid Hefty EU Fines, EUBUSINESS, Mar. 9,
2012, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/italy-regulate.fm1/.
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ers of its golden shares in Eni and other companies.93 It would be a
difficult task to determine whether an international company such as
Eni—with many appearances of a private enterprise but partially
owned by a government whose golden share powers are ambiguous—is
an instrumentality under the FCPA.
In between these two examples are many energy companies
that are owned in part by foreign governments. There are also compa-
nies that are owned in whole or in part by other SOEs, which is the
case with Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (“NLNG”).94 NLNG is a joint
venture that came into existence to develop Nigeria’s natural gas sec-
tor.95 Three private companies own 51 percent of NLNG, and the re-
maining 49 percent is owned by Nigeria’s state-owned petroleum
company.96 The DOJ considers NLNG to be an instrumentality of the
Nigerian government,97 but this might not be obvious to energy com-
panies and others.98  NLNG and these other examples show the vari-
ety of corporate structures in the energy industry and the consequent
challenges that companies can face in interpreting the “instrumental-
ity” provision.
The second reason why the “instrumentality” provision is diffi-
cult for energy companies to abide by is that many of the countries
where energy companies do business have very little transparency.99
This not only means that employees of SOEs and government agencies
are more likely to request, accept, or require bribes,100 but also that
information about corporate structures might not be available.101 This
makes it challenging to learn about the extent of government involve-
ment and control in these entities and carry out a useful “instrumen-
tality” assessment. Performing due diligence on potential clients and
FCPA liability is essential for effective compliance with the statute’s
provisions,102 but a company will be without necessary knowledge
(and susceptible to liability) when key information about the foreign
entities they are working with is unavailable.
93 Id.
94 Our Company: Background, NIGERIA LNG LTD., http://www.nlng.com/PageEng
ine.aspx?&id=35 (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
95 Id.
96 Our Company: Shareholders, NIGERIA LNG LTD., http://www.nlng.com/PageEn
gine.aspx?&id=35 (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
97 KBR Press Release, supra note 41.
98 See RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 26.
99 See supra Section II (“Background”); Subsection A (“The FCPA and the Energy
Industry”).
100 See WORLD BANK, supra note 52, at 11.
101 See HELD BY THE VISIBLE HAND, supra note 11, at 19.
102 E.g., Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
749, 776–77 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-3\rgl302.txt unknown Seq: 13 18-JUN-13 11:53
2013] LESSONS FOR THE ENERGY INDUSTRY 405
III. ANALYSIS
Because the FCPA offers no definition of “instrumentality,”103
the DOJ, industry groups, scholars, and U.S. federal courts interpret it
differently. Increasing guidance from U.S. courts and the DOJ makes
it clear that each situation is fact-specific and the analysis must be
done on a case-by-case basis.104 However, this means that some level
of uncertainty regarding the “instrumentality” provision remains
prevalent.105
A. Perspective of the DOJ
The DOJ has produced two documents for the purpose of pro-
viding FCPA guidance: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (“Resource Guide”)106 and the Lay-Person’s Guide to the
FCPA (“Lay-Person’s Guide”).107 The Lay-Person’s Guide does not ex-
plain what an “instrumentality” is, although it does briefly explain
“foreign official.”108 On the other hand, the Resource Guide explains
the DOJ’s “instrumentality” analysis of SOEs,109 which will surely be
at least somewhat useful for energy companies.
In the Resource Guide, the DOJ emphasizes four factors that
govern its “fact-specific analysis” of SOEs as potential instrumentali-
ties: “ownership, control, status, and function.”110 In making this anal-
ysis, the DOJ also uses factors that district courts have approved in
jury instructions and used in deciding cases. These factors include
“whether key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed
by, government officials,” “the foreign state’s characterization of the
entity and its employees,” and “whether the governmental end or pur-
pose sought to be achieved is expressed in the policies of the foreign
government.”111 Companies are advised “no one factor is dispositive or
necessarily more important than another.”112 An intriguing aspect of
the Resource Guide is the DOJ’s statement that “as a practical matter,
an entity is unlikely to qualify as an instrumentality if a government
103 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 24.
104 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 20.
105 See RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
106 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14.
107 Lay-Person’s Guide, supra note 27.
108 A foreign official can be “any public official, regardless of rank or position.” Id.
at 3.
109 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 20.
110 Id.
111 Id. For the lists of factors from the district courts, see infra subsection C (“Fed-
eral Courts”).
112 E.g., RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 21.
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does not own or control a majority of its shares.”113 However, this
comes with the caveat that there are situations in which the DOJ
would still consider that company to be an instrumentality: the pres-
ence of political appointments, veto power, and a golden share were
enough to make a company an instrumentality in one case because the
“government nevertheless had substantial control over the
company.”114
The DOJ says in the Resource Guide that there should be a
broad interpretation of “instrumentality,”115 and it has implemented
this view in practice.116 Some of these interpretations are less contro-
versial than others. For example, a company almost wholly owned (97
percent) and completely controlled by the government of Haiti is cer-
tainly an instrumentality.117 However, even in more ambiguous situa-
tions, such as minority government ownership (“over one third”) in a
company, the DOJ has still viewed the company at issue as an instru-
mentality.118 Another example is the NLNG situation previously men-
tioned.119 In that enforcement action against KBR,120 the DOJ found
NLNG to be an instrumentality of Nigeria because its largest share-
holder is the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation,121 which is
owned entirely by the Nigerian government.122 KBR clearly violated
the FCPA by paying a number of other bribes to executive branch offi-
cials, but the DOJ’s characterization of NLGN as an instrumentality
with that corporate structure at least raises some question marks.123
The Resource Guide answers a number of questions, yet it is
unlikely that the DOJ can offer more definitive guidance on the “in-
strumentality” provision because of the fact-specific nature of each sit-
uation.124 Only time will tell if the Resource Guide succeeds in
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 E.g., id. at 20.
116 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 25.
117 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 21.
118 Non-Prosecution Agreement at 3, U.S. v. Comverse Tech., Inc., (Apr. 6, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/rae-comverse/04-06-
11comverse-npa.pdf.
119 See supra section II (“Background’), subsection C (“ ‘Instrumentality’ in the En-
ergy Industry”).
120 KBR Press Release, supra note 41.
121 The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation owned 49% when the events in
question occurred. Id.
122 Id.; Oil and Gas in Nigeria, Overview, MBENDI INFO. SERV., http://www.
mbendi.com/indy/oilg/af/ng/p0005.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
123 See RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 26.
124 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 20.
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assuaging the complaints of industry groups and scholars discussed in
the next subsection.
B. Industry Groups and Scholars
On the other side of the spectrum from the DOJ are commenta-
tors that find the DOJ’s interpretation of “instrumentality” far too
broad.125 One of the most prominent complaints about the DOJ’s inter-
pretation is that there is no guidance on the level of ownership that a
government must have in order for the relevant company to be consid-
ered an instrumentality.126 The Chamber of Commerce argues that
the DOJ’s interpretation “effectively sweeps in entities that are only
tangentially related to a foreign government.”127 Using the DOJ’s
logic, the Chamber of Commerce references two U.S. examples to prove
its point: General Motors (“GM”) and American International Group
(“AIG”).128 In 2009, the U.S. government acquired 60 percent of GM’s
shares as part of a bailout to help the company survive bankruptcy.129
In 2008, the U.S. government purchased 79.9 percent of AIG in a simi-
lar bailout.130 The Chamber of Commerce analogizes that under the
DOJ’s reasoning, both AIG and GM would have been considered in-
strumentalities of the U.S. government at the time when the U.S. was
their majority shareholder.131 Had this occurred in a foreign country,
AIG and GM employees would therefore have been considered foreign
officials, which the Chamber of Commerce calls “absurd.”132
125 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 25.
126 Id. at 27.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 David E. Sanger et al., G.M. to Bankruptcy and a New Start, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
1, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/business/01auto.
html?n=Top%2fReference%2fTimes%20Topics%2fSubjects%2fA%2fAutomobiles&
_r=0. The U.S. government has since sold its majority but still owns 26.5 percent
of the shares. Jeff Bennett & Sharon Terlep, U.S. Balks at GM Plan: Government
Is Reluctant to Sell Auto Stake at a Huge Loss, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2012, at A1,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044399560457800075
4035510658.html.
130 Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout;
Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A1,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122156561931242905.html. As with
GM, the government has since sold a significant number of shares, putting its
current ownership level at around 15 percent. Leslie Scism et al., Treasury Sells
Chunk of AIG: Deal Marks End of U.S. Majority Ownership of Insurer, Earns
Profit for Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2012, at C3, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB40000872396390444554704577644311101081138.html.
131 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
132 Id.
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Alluding to another broad view of the “instrumentality” provi-
sion, the Chamber of Commerce discusses the Baker Hughes enforce-
ment action, in which the DOJ found an entity “controlled by officials
of the Government of Kazakhstan” to be an instrumentality.133 Again
analogizing to an example in the U.S., the Chamber of Commerce ref-
erenced New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg.134 Mayor Bloom-
berg owns 88 percent of Bloomberg LP.135 According to the DOJ’s logic
in the Baker Hughes enforcement action, the Chamber of Commerce
argues that Bloomberg LP can be considered an instrumentality (and
its employees therefore foreign officials) because it is controlled by a
government official in the U.S.136 These results present significant
challenges for U.S. businesses in their efforts to do business abroad.137
Another complaint is that there is nothing in the legislative
history that suggests that Congress intended SOEs to be included in
the definition of “instrumentality.”138 Mike Koehler, for example, sub-
mitted a declaration in the U.S. v. Carson case rejecting the DOJ’s
broad interpretation of the “instrumentality” provision.139 In his decla-
ration, he analyzed a number of bills, reports, amendments, and hear-
ing transcripts encompassing over thirty years of legislative history.140
His conclusion was that Congress never explicitly said that SOEs were
to be interpreted as instrumentalities, and that there is a considerable
amount of evidence indicating that Congress “did not intend the ‘for-
eign official’ definition to include employees of SOEs.”141
Some suggest that there should be a new definition of these
terms,142 while others suggest specific clarifications of the “instrumen-
tality” provision by having it “apply to foreign companies that are ma-
133 Id. (citing Plea Agreement at 6, U.S. v. Baker Hughes Serv. Int’l, No. 07-129
(S.D. Tx. Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
cases/baker-hughs/04-11-07bakerhughes-plea.pdf).
134 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
135 #8 Michael Bloomberg, FORBES.COM, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/54/400
list08_Michael-Bloomberg_C610.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
136 See RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., Koehler Declaration, supra note 71, at 4.
139 Id. at 10–144. Witness testimony, such as Professor Koehler’s in U.S. v. Car-
son, can often be given through a sworn declaration, which is “a succinct written
statement of the direct testimony which that witness would be prepared to give if
questions were propounded in the usual fashion at trial.” Union State Bank v.
Geller, 170 B.R. 183, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
140 Koehler Declaration, supra note 71, at 10–144.
141  Id. at 4.
142 See, e.g., RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
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jority-owned or controlled by their respective governments.”143 Others
agree that by using a majority ownership test “and by delineating
other elements of ‘dominant influence’ such as majority voting rights
and the ability to appoint the majority of directors and senior manag-
ers, Congress or the courts will permit U.S. companies to make ra-
tional assessments of their FCPA exposure.”144 In any case, the
private sector does not agree with the DOJ’s broad interpretation of
this provision.145
C. Federal Courts
U.S. federal courts have begun addressing the “instrumental-
ity” provision in recent years, which represents a new trend in FCPA
enforcement.146 Additional case law on the subject should be coming in
the near future, including the first case on this provision to reach the
U.S. Court of Appeals.147 A few recent district court cases provide
some useful guidance on a number of issues regarding SOEs and
instrumentalities.
Two cases from the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California list specific factors that companies and the DOJ can use
to help assess whether an SOE should be considered an instrumental-
ity under the FCPA.148 In U.S. v. Carson, the court gave a non-exhaus-
tive set of factors for making this determination:
143 Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63
BUS. LAW. 1243, 1246 (2008).
144 Court E. Golumbic & Jonathan P. Adams, The “Dominant Influence” Test: The
FCPA’s “Instrumentality” and “Foreign Official” Requirements and the Investment
Activity of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 51 (2011).
145 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 25.
146 See, e.g., Steptoe & Johnson LLP,“State-Owned Enterprises” Under the FCPA 1
(June 3, 2011), available at http://www.steptoe.com/publications-newsletter-pdf.
html/pdf/?item_id=209 [hereinafter State-Owned Enterprises].
147 Michael P. Tremoglie, 11th Circuit Given Question of FCPA ‘Instrumentality’
Definition, LEGAL NEWSLINE LEGAL J. (Aug. 27, 2012) http://legalnewsline.com/in-
the-spotlight/237130-11th-circuit-given-question-of-fcpa-instrumentality-defini-
tion. This case involves a jury instruction that the defendants found to be incor-
rect: “[the] instructions broadly defined ‘instrumentality’ as ‘a means or agency
through which a function of the foreign government is accomplished,’ and then
permitted the jury to find Teleco an ‘instrumentality’ of the government if, among
other things, it: (1) provided [undefined] ‘services’ to the citizens of Haiti; (2) was
owned by the Haitian government; or (3) ‘was widely perceived and understood’ to
be performing official or governmental functions.” Reply Brief of Defendant at
37–38, U.S. v. Esquenazi, No. 11-15331 (11th Cir. Oct. 4, 2012).
148 U.S. v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Ca. 2011); Order Denying Defend-
ants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 though [sic] 10 of the Indictment, U.S. v. Carson,
No. 09-77, (C.D. Ca. May 18, 2011) [hereinafter Carson Order].
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• The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and
its employees;
• The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity;
• The purpose of the entity’s activities;
• The entity’s obligations and privileges under the for-
eign state’s law, including whether the entity exer-
cises exclusive or controlling power to administer its
designated functions;
• The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation;
and
• The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity,
including the level of financial support by the state
(e.g., subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans).149
In U.S. v. Aguilar, this same district court used a slightly different
approach in creating additional factors.150 The court looked at a num-
ber of characteristics of government “departments” and “agencies,” the
two words that precede “instrumentality” in the FCPA’s definition of
“foreign official,”151 to determine that the SOE in question exhibited
similar traits and was therefore an instrumentality of a foreign
government:
• The entity provides a service to the citizens — in-
deed, in many cases to all the inhabitants — of the
jurisdiction.
• The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are
appointed by, government officials.
• The entity is financed, at least in large measure,
through governmental appropriations or through rev-
enues obtained as a result of government-mandated
taxes, licenses, fees or royalties, such as entrance fees
to a national park.
• The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or
controlling power to administer its designated
functions.
• The entity is widely perceived and understood to be
performing official (i.e., governmental) functions.152
These factors give companies specific characteristics to look at
as they try to determine whether a potential client would be consid-
149 Carson Order, supra note 148, at 5.
150 U.S. v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
151 The definition of foreign official says “any officer or employee of a foreign gov-
ernment or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof . . .” Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A),
-3(f)(2)(A) (2012).
152 U.S. v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
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ered an instrumentality of a foreign government. The district court
also mentioned that “this is a fact-specific question that depends on
the nature and characteristics of the business entity.”153 Furthermore,
it should be noted that none of these factors are dispositive in this
analysis.154 In fact, in Carson, the court said that even complete own-
ership is insufficient on its own to make an entity an instrumentality
for FCPA purposes.155 The court added that the DOJ’s burden to prove
that an SOE is an instrumentality is a “substantial evidentiary
burden.”156
From these cases, it is clear that the “instrumentality” provi-
sion can be interpreted to include SOEs, meaning an SOE’s employees
can be considered foreign officials under the FCPA.157 This certainly
does not mean that all entities with state ownership will be considered
instrumentalities, as these opinions have made clear.158 However, be-
cause every case is fact-specific, and the courts have looked at each on
a case-by-case basis,159 there is still a significant amount of uncer-
tainty on the subject.160
IV. PROPOSAL
Finding problems with the FCPA’s “instrumentality” provision
and the DOJ’s interpretation is far easier than offering workable solu-
tions. For example, one prevalent proposal is that Congress should
amend the FCPA again to further define “foreign official” or “instru-
mentality.”161 However, this proposal ignores the fact that Congress is
the source of the current text of the statute, and any amendments
could make these terms even more confusing. Another proposal is that
Congress or the DOJ should specifically state what percentage of gov-
ernment ownership or control is required for an entity to be considered
an instrumentality.162 This is unworkable in practice and would not be
beneficial for the DOJ or U.S. industries. As the Resource Guide and
U.S. courts have said, ownership and control are not the only relevant
factors in this analysis.163 For example, setting the standard at over
50 percent of government ownership would mean that the DOJ’s en-
153 Carson Order, supra note 148, at 12.
154 Id. at 5.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 16.
157 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A) (2012).
158 U.S. v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; Carson Order, supra note 148, at 13.
159 E.g., Carson Order, supra note 148, at 12.
160  E.g., State-Owned Enterprises, supra note 146 at 4.
161 E.g., RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 27.
162 Id.
163 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 20.
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forcement efforts would be frustrated where a government’s level of
ownership is below that number even if there is significant govern-
ment control.164 On the other hand, a company whose government
ownership exceeds 50 percent but by all other indicators appears to
function outside of government influence and control could be an in-
strumentality and result in FCPA liability for companies that are not
careful.
These proposals also lack an understanding of the fact-specific
nature of the analysis, which has been emphasized by both the DOJ165
and the courts.166 Even with useful additional guidance, such as the
Resource Guide, it must still be applied to the facts of each case. U.S.
companies would likely have an equally difficult time figuring out
whether those new definitions and guidelines apply to the entity with
which they are doing business.
Congress could eliminate this confusion by prohibiting all
forms of foreign bribery and not just bribery of foreign officials.167 By
making it illegal to bribe anyone, U.S. law would no longer require the
DOJ, federal courts, or U.S. companies to determine what an instru-
mentality is because every employee of every foreign entity would be
covered. In the meantime, U.S. companies must deal with the ambigu-
ity of the “instrumentality” provision. Energy companies in particular
will continue to face difficulties due to the number of SOEs, the large
variety of corporate structures, and pervasive government ownership
and control in the industry.168 However, energy companies do not need
Congress to act to prevent FCPA liability under these provisions. They
can take actions to protect themselves from FCPA liability arising out
of ambiguous scenarios involving SOEs and their employees. This can
be done through rigorous corporate compliance programs that prohibit
any form of bribery.169 In essence, energy companies should treat all
foreign companies as if they were instrumentalities of foreign govern-
ments and all foreign colleagues as if they were foreign officials.170
164 The DOJ specifically referred to such an example in its recently published gui-
dance. Id. at 21.
165 See id. at 20.
166 Carson Order, supra note 148, at 12.
167 Some have proposed this as an action that the U.S. should take. E.g., Peter
Jeydel, Yoking the Bull: How to Make the FCPA Work for U.S. Business, 43 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 523, 529 n.29 (2012) (citing GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, supra note 23, at 1).
168 See supra Section II (“Background”), Subsection C (“ ‘Instrumentality’ in the
Energy Industry”).
169 Some companies have already created compliance programs to do so. GLOBAL
FIN. INTEGRITY, supra note 23, at 1.
170 Companies have begun doing so to specifically avoid trouble under the “foreign
official” provision. Id.
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Such a compliance program might appear excessive, but it is the safest
way to ensure that no FCPA liability arises under these provisions.
This type of compliance program should not be difficult to cre-
ate, considering the impact of other statutes on energy companies. The
Bribery Act became effective in the United Kingdom (“UK”) in 2011,171
and the statute clearly has already had a significant influence on en-
ergy companies and their anti-bribery compliance programs.172 The
Bribery Act criminalizes bribery of foreign public officials173 and any-
one else.174 This means that any form of bribery is a criminal act
under the Bribery Act.175 A company is also liable for failing to prevent
bribery committed by persons associated with the company.176 The ju-
risdictional reach of the Bribery Act is significant: in addition to any
relevant act or omission that occurs within the UK,177 jurisdiction also
exists for violations occurring outside of the UK made by a person with
a “close connection” to the UK.”178 Furthermore, regarding a com-
pany’s failure to prevent bribery, jurisdiction exists for any corporation
or partnership “which carries on a business, or part of a business, in
any part of the United Kingdom.”179 There is jurisdiction regardless of
where the corporation or partnership is incorporated or formed,180 and
also regardless of where the act in question occurs.181
Therefore, because most, if not all, energy companies have of-
fices in the UK or do at least some business there,182 they are subject
171 Jon Jordan, The Need for a Comprehensive International Foreign Bribery Com-
pliance Program, Covering A to Z, in an Expanding Global Anti-Bribery Environ-
ment, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 89, 96 (2012).
172 See, e.g., ANGLO AMERICAN PLC ET AL., PRINCIPLES FOR AN ANTI-CORRUPTION
PROGRAMME UNDER THE UK BRIBERY ACT 2012 IN THE ENERGY & EXTRACTIVES SEC-
TOR (2011), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAG
ING/global_assets/e_s_assets/e_s_assets_2010/downloads_pdfs/Principles_for_an_
AntiCorruption_Programme.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).
173 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6 (Among other factors, the statute generally says:
“A person (‘P’) who bribes a foreign public official (‘F’) is guilty of an offence if P’s
intention is to influence F in F’s capacity as a foreign public official.”).
174 Id. § 1 (“A person (‘P’) is guilty of an offence if . . . P offers, promises or gives a
financial or other advantage to another person . . .” in exchange for the stated
business advantages. (emphasis added)).
175 E.g., Jordan, supra note 171, at 96.
176 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7.
177 Id. § 12(1).
178 Id. § 12(2)–(3). This includes British citizens, companies incorporated in the
UK, and primary residents of the UK, among others. See id. § 12(4).
179 Id. § 7(5).
180 Id.
181 Id. § 12(5).
182 E.g., United Kingdom: Contact Us, CHEVRON, http://www.chevron.com/coun
tries/unitedkingdom/contactus/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2012); Contact Us, SHELL,
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to the Bribery Act’s provisions.183 As a consequence, these companies
should already have mechanisms in place to prevent bribery of all for-
eign persons, including employees of entities that the DOJ considers to
be instrumentalities under the FCPA.184 Knowing that most, if not all,
of the world’s energy companies face the same legal constraints should
provide some comfort to U.S. energy companies who are concerned
about losing business as a result of such a substantial upgrade to their
compliance programs.185 Furthermore, the DOJ warns in the Resource
Guide that “whether an entity is an instrumentality of a foreign gov-
ernment or a private entity, commercial (i.e., private-to-private) brib-
ery may still violate the FCPA’s accounting provisions, the Travel Act,
anti-money laundering laws, and other federal . . . laws.”186 In sum, in
the face of potential liability under the FCPA, other U.S. laws, and the
Bribery Act, energy companies have plenty of incentives to strengthen
their enforcement mechanisms to prevent all forms of bribery to em-
ployees of any foreign entity.
V. CONCLUSION
The DOJ is closely watching the energy industry and bringing
a number of actions against companies that violate the FCPA.187 The
“instrumentality” provision of the FCPA is particularly ambiguous for
the energy industry due the number of SOEs and range of corporate
structures in the industry.188 However, the provision has significant
implications because employees of instrumentalities are considered
foreign officials under the FCPA, which means that they cannot be
bribed.189 The DOJ has interpreted “instrumentality” to include
http://www.shell.co.uk/home/content/gbr/footer/contact_us/ (last visited Dec. 13,
2012); Cutting Edge Technology in the UK, PETROBRAS, http://www.petrobras.com/
en/countries/united-kingdom/united-kingdom.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2012).
183 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(5).
184 E.g., Jordan, supra note 171, at 89.
185 A common complaint from U.S. companies of all industries is that the FCPA
causes them to lose business to companies that do not have similar laws in their
countries. E.g., Jessica A. Lordi, Note, The U.K. Bribery Act: Endless Jurisdic-
tional Liability on Corporate Violators, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 955, 984–85
(2012). One estimate listed the annual amount of lost export revenue at $1 billion.
RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 6 (citing MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., RL30079, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2 (1999)).
186 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 21.
187 Tippee, supra note 5 (citing TRACE INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT RE-
PORT 2011 9 (2011)).
188 See supra Section II (“Background”), Subsection C (“ ‘Instrumentality’ in the
Energy Industry”).
189 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -
3(f)(2)(A) (2012).
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SOEs,190 and federal courts thus far have largely agreed with the
DOJ.191 Industry groups and scholars have disagreed with these inter-
pretations, and many have asked for more guidance.192 The DOJ has
responded with factors that industries can use in assessing whether an
entity is an instrumentality.193 However, energy companies must still
exercise caution because the analysis is very fact-specific and per-
formed on a case-by-case basis.194
Because of the ambiguities surrounding the “instrumentality”
provision,195 and the DOJ’s broad interpretation of it,196 it is not ad-
visable for energy companies to attempt to maneuver through these
provisions and risk FCPA liability. Instead, it would be best for compa-
nies to strengthen their compliance programs in order to treat any for-
eign entity as if it were an instrumentality of a foreign government.197
While this may appear to be a severe measure, the Bribery Act and
other statutes make such compliance programs necessary.198 Most im-
portantly, it is the most effective method that companies can use to
prevent FCPA liability when working with foreign energy companies.
190 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 20.
191 See, e.g., Carson Order, supra note 148, at 12.
192 E.g., Westbrook, supra note 20, at 576.
193 RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 14, at 20–21.
194 See, e.g., id. at 20.
195 RESTORING BALANCE, supra note 1, at 24.
196 Id.
197 Some companies have already begun doing so. GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY, supra
note 23, at 1.
198 E.g., Jordan, supra note 171, at 89.
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\12-3\rgl302.txt unknown Seq: 24 18-JUN-13 11:53
